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CLEANING THE MESS OF THE MEANS 
TEST: THE NEED FOR A CASE-BY-
CASE ANALYSIS OF 401(k) LOANS IN 
CHAPTER 7 BANKRUPTCY PETITIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
How much money will you need in retirement to maintain your cur-
rent lifestyle?  Many financial planners suggest that you may need at 
least 70% to 80% of your current annual income to maintain your way of 
life, while others say the figure is closer to 100% or more.1  As a result of 
the declining economy, balances in retirement accounts are roughly 25% 
lower than they were before the recession.2  However, experts suggest 
that even before the recent recession most Americans were not saving 
enough for retirement.3  Because Social Security alone will not provide 
adequate retirement income for most people, and fewer companies are 
offering traditional pension plans, a 401(k) plan has become an essential 
part of the average worker’s retirement.4  As a result, more than 40 mil-
lion U.S. workers have saved for retirement through the help of 401(k) 
plans.5 
Although there are numerous tax incentives to continued investing 
 
 1 TED BENNA & BRENDA WATSON NEWMANN, 401(k)S FOR DUMMIES 18 (2003). 
 2 Editorial, About Your 401(k), N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2009, at A18, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/24/opinion/24mon1.html?scp=16&sq=&st=nyt. 
 3 Id. 
 4 TED BENNA & BRENDA WATSON NEWMANN, 401(k)S FOR DUMMIES 9 (2003). 
 5 Id.  401(k) savings plans are a way in which employees can contribute pre-tax earnings 
toward retirement.  This money earns interest while invested and cannot be taken out before the age 
of 59½ without harsh penalties.  Many participants have said that the 401(k) has helped them save 
thousands of dollars that they otherwise would have spent carelessly.  Id. at 15. 
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in a 401(k) plan, and the penalties for early withdrawal are harsh, some 
participants have found it necessary to access this money before retire-
ment.  One of the only ways to avoid paying a federal penalty for early 
withdrawal, and in some states an additional state penalty, is to borrow 
money through a 401(k) loan.6  In fact, “[t]he most recent industry sur-
veys show that about 20 to 25 percent of eligible employees have out-
standing loans.”7  Unfortunately, even with 401(k) loan assistance, some 
borrowers have filed for bankruptcy due to overwhelming debt.  Al-
though the remaining funds in a 401(k) are protected from creditors in a 
bankruptcy proceeding,8 funds that were borrowed through a 401(k) loan 
have not received the same treatment.9  This discrepancy is unduly pre-
judicial for petitioners with 401(k) loans trying to get a fresh start in 
bankruptcy. 
Recent changes to the Bankruptcy Code10 have made it nearly im-
possible, or at least extremely difficult, for a debtor with monthly income 
greater than the median income in his or her state11 to successfully peti-
tion for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.12  Since the passage of the Bankruptcy 
 
 6 Many 401(k) participants choose to take a 401(k) loan over a traditional unsecured loan for 
a number of reasons: there are minimal qualifications and credit requirements to obtain a 401(k) 
loan; the interest rate charged is nominal, and in most plans the interest paid is deposited back into 
the account; most loans allow for a five-year repayment plan through automatic deductions from the 
employee’s paycheck; and many plan providers can have a loan funded within a matter of days.  Ron 
Lieber, When Credit Gets Tight, a 401(k) Loan Becomes Tempting, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2008, at C1; 
IWASZKO, KNUTE AND BRIAN O’CONNELL, THE 401(k) MILLIONAIRE 188 (1999).  According to the 
IRS, a participant may borrow from a 401(k) retirement plan without tax penalties or liability if three 
criteria are met: 1) the amount borrowed is limited to 50% of the vested account balance, or $50,000, 
whichever is less; 2) the loan is repaid within five years, unless the loan is used to purchase the par-
ticipant’s main home; and 3) the loan repayments are made in substantially level payments, at least 
quarterly, over the life of the loan.  401k Resource Guide – Plan Sponsors – General Distribution 
Rules, IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/retirement/sponsor/article/0,,id=151926,00.html (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2010). 
 7 Ron Lieber, When Credit Gets Tight, a 401(k) Loan Becomes Tempting, N.Y. TIMES, July 
5, 2008, at C1. 
 8 11 U.S.C.A. § 522 (Westlaw 2010). 
 9 Similarly, voluntary contributions to 401(k) plans have received varied treatment in bank-
ruptcy petitions.  See James Winston Kim, Saving Our Future: Why Voluntary Contributions to Re-
tirement Accounts Are Reasonable Expenses, 26 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 341 (2010) (arguing that 
voluntary contributions to retirement accounts can be reasonably necessary expenses). 
 10 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1527 (Westlaw 2010).  Unless otherwise noted, all references to the 
Bankruptcy Code, Code, or § are to Title 11 of the United States Code. 
 11 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(7) (Westlaw 2010).  No party in interest to the bankruptcy proceed-
ing, nor a judge, may file a motion for dismissal under § 707(b)(2) for those petitioners with a cur-
rent monthly income equal to or less than the median family income for a comparable household, 
thereby precluding this group of petitioners from the application of the means test. 
 12 For a more detailed overview of Chapter 7 bankruptcy petitions and the means test, see 
Robert J. Landry, III, The Means Test: Finding a Safe Harbor, Passing the Means Test, or Rebutting 
the Presumption of Abuse May Not Be Enough, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 245 (2009). 
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Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA),13 
courts have differed on the question whether monthly repayments to a 
401(k) loan are deductible as “Other Necessary Expenses”14 under the 
“means test”15 of Chapter 7 when determining a petitioner’s monthly 
disposable income.16  In courts that do not recognize a deduction for 
401(k) loan repayments, the means test may not accurately calculate a 
debtor’s ability to repay creditors.17  Thus, in those courts, a Chapter 7 
petition will likely be wrongly dismissed for being presumptively abu-
sive of the provisions of Chapter 7.  As a result, courts err in not allow-
ing a means-test deduction for 401(k) loan repayments. 
This Comment examines the relevant case law regarding Chapter 7 
petitions and the policy implications of not considering 401(k) loan re-
payment a necessary expense.  Section II provides an overview of the 
treatment of 401(k) loans in bankruptcy, as well as a more detailed re-
view of means testing and an analysis of Other Necessary Expenses.  
Section III argues that courts should look to the facts and circumstances 
surrounding petitions to determine whether 401(k) loan repayments can 
be deducted as necessary expenses, and that doing so will not affect the 
ability of courts to properly dismiss abusive petitions under a totality-of-
the-circumstances analysis.  This Comment concludes that a 401(k) loan-
repayment deduction may be proper, and therefore a case-by-case analy-
sis of a Chapter 7 petition is equitable for debtors subject to the means 
test. 
 
 13 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), Pub. L. 
No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of Chapter 11 of the Unit-
ed States Code). 
 14 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (Westlaw 2010) (allowing a deduction for the “actual 
monthly expenses for the categories specified as Other Necessary Expenses issued by the Internal 
Revenue Service”). 
 15 The “means test” is a mechanical calculation to determine whether a presumption of abuse 
of the provisions of bankruptcy attaches. 
 16 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b) (Westlaw 2010). 
 17 There are two reasons those courts may misinterpret a debtor’s ability to repay creditors: 
(1) these monthly repayment amounts are necessary expenses and should be statutorily deducted 
from the debtor’s monthly disposable income under § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii), and therefore the courts are 
incorrect in their mathematical calculations of debtors’ disposable income under the means test; and 
(2) 401(k) loan repayments are generally mandatorily deducted from an employee’s paycheck, and 
those courts essentially require that debtors cease repayment of these loans, treating the remaining 
loan balances as early withdrawals, and pay the federal penalties (and in some cases additional state 
penalties) associated with early withdrawal, thereby imposing additional unfair penalties on debtors.  
Requiring an employee to pay early withdrawal penalties may leave less than 50% of what the court 
considers available to creditors. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. THE MEANS TEST OF THE BAPCPA AND 401(k) LOAN TREATMENT 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy “discharges the debtor from all debts that 
arose before the date of the order for relief under this chapter.”18  For 
decades, Congress debated reform in an attempt to prevent petitioners 
from completely discharging debts in favor of the repayment of credi-
tors.19  After a long and arduous road to reform, Congress passed the 
2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
(BAPCPA).20  The BAPCPA is meant to address abuses of the bank-
ruptcy process and to steer debtors away from Chapter 7 into Chapter 13 
plans where they will be forced to repay a portion of their debts.21  While 
passing the BAPCPA was difficult,22 the practical application of the 
 
 18 11 U.S.C.A. § 727(b) (Westlaw 2010).  Procedurally, upon the filing of either a Chapter 7 
or Chapter 13 petition, an automatic stay is triggered that prevents creditors from collecting payment 
from the debtor.  11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a) (Westlaw 2010).  For example, the automatic stay prevents 
the enforcement of judgments, or the collection, assessment, or recovery of a claim against the peti-
tioner.  11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a)(2), (6) (Westlaw 2010).  While protecting the debtor from his or her 
creditors during bankruptcy proceedings, the automatic stay is not a complete bar of any action 
against the debtor.  It does not protect against the commencement or continuation of criminal pro-
ceedings against the petitioner or civil proceedings and related collections with issues of paternity, 
child custody, marriage, or domestic violence.  11 U.S.C.A. § 362(b)(1), (2)(A)-(B) (Westlaw 2010). 
 19 Congress, and creditor lobbyists, had considered means testing as an element of bank-
ruptcy reform in every session since 1997.  Eugene R. Wedoff, Means Testing in the New §707(b), 
79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 231, 231 (2005).  For a general discussion of the political battles over bank-
ruptcy reform in the 1990’s, see Melissa B. Jacoby, Negotiating Bankruptcy Legislation Through the 
News Media, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1091 (2004), and Robert J. Landry, III, The Policy and Forces Be-
hind Consumer Bankruptcy Reform: A Classic Battle over Problem Definition, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 
509 (2003).  This debate was largely due to the increased number of bankruptcy petitions as a whole, 
and more specifically, the significantly increased number of Chapter 7 petitions through the 1990’s.  
Henry J. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense Out of Nonsense: Representing Consumers Under the 
“Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,” 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191, 
191-92 (2005). 
 20 Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of Chap-
ter 11 of the United States Code). 
 21 See In re Hardacre, 338 B.R. 718, 720 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006) (stating that the intent of 
the BAPCPA was to prevent “easy access to chapter 7 liquidation proceedings by consumer debtors 
who, if required to file under chapter 13, could afford to pay some dividend to their unsecured credi-
tors”).  Chapter 7 is most commonly compared to Chapter 13 bankruptcy, in which a debtor gener-
ally projects his or her future financial circumstances for a period of three or five years, depending 
upon the current monthly income of the debtor as compared to the median income of a similar-size 
family, and submits a plan to repay creditors.  11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(b)(4) (Westlaw 2010).  A Chapter 
13 plan must be approved by the court, and upon completion of the repayment period, any remaining 
debts will be discharged.  11 U.S.C.A. § 1325 (Westlaw 2010). 
 22 During remarks, proceedings and debates of Congress while attempting to pass the 
BAPCPA, many politicians and other individuals stood up in stark opposition to the Act.  For exam-
4
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BAPCPA’s principles is proving to be even more laborious.23  The most 
significant change was the addition of the means test: a mechanical cal-
culation used to objectively determine whether a petitioner is abusing the 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 24  The means test was purposely de-
signed to make it more difficult to obtain a total discharge of unsecured 
debts in a Chapter 7 proceeding.25 
A petition must be dismissed, or converted to a petition under Chap-
ter 11 or Chapter 13, if the court determines that it constitutes an abuse 
of the Bankruptcy Code for an individual filing under Chapter 7 with 
primarily consumer debts.26  The means test provides the calculation for 
determining whether a presumption of abuse arises.27  For certain indi-
viduals, there are safe harbors in which the means test is not applied.28  
Safe-harbor provisions apply when (1) the petitioner is a debtor with 
“current monthly income” below the median household income in his or 
her state,29 or (2) the petitioner is a disabled veteran.30  However, even if 
 
ple, The Honorable Lucille Roybal-Allard of California remarked, “This bill would negatively affect 
millions of hard-working Americans, particularly veterans and victims of identity theft.  The 
[BAPCPA] is a bad bill because it favors credit card companies at the expense of hard-working 
Americans, veterans, and victims of identity theft.  It creates a means test which would make it im-
possible for families to be protected even when they have suffered debt due to illness or unemploy-
ment, preventing them from being able to start over in life.  While the bill makes it harder for these 
individuals to eliminate their debt, it unnecessarily strengthens the hands of creditors.  For example, 
this bill does not guarantee that hard-working parents can make child support payments over credit 
card debt payments.”  151 CONG. REC. E838-04 (daily ed. May 2, 2005) (statement of Hon. Lucille 
Roybal-Allard). 
 23 Robert J. Landry, III, The Means Test: Finding a Safe Harbor, Passing the Means Test, or 
Rebutting the Presumption of Abuse May Not Be Enough, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 245, 246 (2009). 
 24 Eisen v. Thompson, 370 B.R. 762, 771 (N.D. Ohio 2007). 
 25 Id. 
 26 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(1) (Westlaw 2010). 
 27 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (Westlaw 2010) (stating “the court shall presume abuse 
exists if the debtor’s current monthly income reduced by the amounts determined under clauses (ii), 
(iii), and (iv), and multiplied by 60 is not less than the lesser of--(I) 25 percent of the debtor’s non-
priority unsecured claims in the case, or $7,025, whichever is greater; or (II) $11,725”). 
 28 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(D), (b)(7) (Westlaw 2010). 
 29 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(7) (Westlaw 2010).  To determine whether a petitioner falls within 
this first safe-harbor provision, the petitioner must look to his or her income for the past 6 months, 
average that income, and place it onto Form 22A, the “Abuse Test” form.  Robert C. Meyer, Chapter 
7 and Chapter 13 Issues 3-4, http://www.robertcmeyer.com/PDF/Chapter7and13issuespdf.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2010).  The average six-month income figure is called the “current monthly income” 
(CMI).  11 U.S.C.A. § 101(10A) (Westlaw 2010).  According to the census bureau, median income 
varies significantly by state.  State Median Income, 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/statemedfaminc.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).  The 
lowest median income reported for the years 2007-2009 for three-year average medians is $36,650 
in Mississippi; the highest median income reported for the years 2007-2009 for three-year average 
medians is $66,654 in New Hampshire.  Id.  When filing for bankruptcy and submitting the appro-
priate financial paperwork, income, in a factual context, is commonly difficult to determine with the 
loss of jobs.  Robert C. Meyer, Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 Issues 5, 
5
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the safe-harbor provisions shield the petitioner from the means test’s pre-
sumption of abuse, a court may still dismiss a petition on procedural 
grounds for unreasonable delay, lack of proper payment of fees, or a fail-
ure to provide the required documents.31  The court may also dismiss a 
petition if it determines that under a “totality of the circumstances” the 
individual should not benefit from Chapter 7 bankruptcy.32 
If the debtor’s current monthly income is greater than the median 
income of his or her state, thereby excluding the debtor from the safe-
harbor provisions, the court then uses the means test to determine the 
amount that the debtor can repay to his or her creditors.33  Under the 
means test, the court deducts the total amount of the debtor’s statutorily 
approved monthly expenses from the debtor’s current monthly income.34  
This final figure is the debtor’s monthly disposable income, i.e., the 
amount of money every month with which the debtor can repay his or 
her creditors after paying for things such as living expenses, food, and 
insurance.35  The monthly disposable-income figure is then multiplied by 
sixty to determine how much money the debtor has to pay back to his or 
her creditors over a five-year period.36  If the debtor’s five-year dispos-
able income is less than the lesser of either (1) 25% of the debtor’s unse-
cured debts or $7,025, whichever is greater, or (2) $11,725, then the deb-
tor may remain in Chapter 7.37  If the debtor’s five-year disposable 
 
http://www.robertcmeyer.com/PDF/Chapter7and13issuespdf.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).  This 
creates problems in that a petitioner who has recently been terminated from employment will have 
no current monthly income, yet the average of his or her income over the past 6 months may be sig-
nificant.  So while the petitioner has no current money to pay rent, bills, or creditors, the petitioner 
will likely not be able to successfully file for bankruptcy.  Id. at 3-4.  This is especially true today.  
In its worst economic state since the Great Depression, the unemployment rate is at 9.6%. News Re-
lease, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, The Employment Situation—September 2010 
(Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf. 
 30 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(7) (Westlaw 2010). 
 31 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(a) (Westlaw 2010). 
 32 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(c) (Westlaw 2010).  In determining whether to dismiss a petition or 
convert it to Chapter 13, the court may look to whether the totality of the circumstances of the deb-
tor’s financial situation demonstrates abuse of the provisions of Chapter 7 bankruptcy. 
 33 Robert J. Landry, III, The Means Test: Finding a Safe Harbor, Passing the Means Test, or 
Rebutting the Presumption of Abuse May Not Be Enough, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 245, 256-57 (2009). 
 34 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2(A)(ii) (Westlaw 2010).  The deductions stated include, but are not 
limited to, expenses for health and disability insurance, reasonably necessary expenses to maintain 
the safety of the debtor and his or her family from family violence, expenses for food and clothing, 
and actual expenses for the care of an elderly, ill, or disabled household member. 
 35 For a list of all deductions allowed, see 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii) (Westlaw 2010). 
 36 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (Westlaw 2010).  The court looks to the debtor’s ability to 
repay creditors over a five-year period in order to determine whether the debtor is better suited for 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy.  Chapter 13 petitioners are required to provide for repayments to creditors 
over a five-year period.  11 U.S.C.A. § 1322(a)(4) (Westlaw 2010). 
 37 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (Westlaw 2010) . The statutory amounts of $7,025 and 
6
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income does not meet this test, the presumption of abuse arises, and if it 
is not rebutted, the debtor must amend his or her petition to file for Chap-
ter 13 bankruptcy, or the petition will be dismissed.38 
In other words, if the debtor’s monthly disposable income is less 
than approximately $120 ($7,02539 over 60 months), the presumption of 
abuse does not arise.40  If the debtor’s monthly disposable income is 
greater than approximately $200 ($11,72541 over 60 months), then the 
presumption of abuse arises.42  Finally, if the debtor’s monthly dispos-
able income is between about $120 and $200, the presumption of abuse 
does not arise if this amount over 60 months is not sufficient to pay at 
least 25% of the debtor’s “nonpriority unsecured claims.”43 
As one bankruptcy court explained, by enacting the BAPCPA Con-
gress clearly lowered the standard for dismissal of Chapter 7 petitions; 
however, pre-BAPCPA case law applying these concepts is still helpful 
in determining whether a debtor is abusing Chapter 7 bankruptcy.44  The 
means test is a statutory expansion of the concept that only a “needy” 
debtor is entitled to Chapter 7 liquidation relief.45  This concept is di-
rectly related to the reduction of the standard for dismissal under § 
707(b) from “substantial abuse” to “an abuse” of Chapter 7 relief.46 
Bankruptcy scholars have noted that “[t]he mathematical formula 
incorporated from §707(b)(2) is unrelated to the provisions of the pro-
posed [Chapter 13 bankruptcy] plan and bears no obvious relationship to 
the amount of money that will actually be available from the debtor for 
payments to unsecured creditors if the plan is confirmed.”47  If a debtor’s 
 
$11,725 are adjusted for inflation every three years.  11 U.S.C.A. § 104 (Westlaw 2010). 
 38 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(1) (Westlaw 2010).  A discussion of rebutting the presumption of 
abuse is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
 39 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) (Westlaw 2010). 
 40 Eisen v. Thompson, 370 B.R. 762, 765 (N.D. Ohio 2007). 
 41 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (Westlaw 2010). 
 42 Thompson, 370 B.R. at 765. 
 43 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) (Westlaw 2010); Thompson, 370 B.R. at 765. “Nonpri-
ority unsecured claims” is another way of saying the debtor’s unsecured debt.  For example, if a 
debtor had a monthly disposable income of $150, he or she would be able to repay $9,000 over a 
period of 60 months.  The presumption of abuse would not arise for such a debtor if his or her unse-
cured debt was greater than $36,000 (25% of $36,000 is $9,000).  However, if such a debtor had 
unsecured debt of $24,000, the presumption of abuse would arise (25% of $24,000 is $6,000, and the 
debtor has the ability to pay more than $6,000 over the following 60 months). 
 44 In re Mestemaker, 359 B.R. 849 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007). 
 45 In re Behlke, 358 F.3d 429, 434 (6th Cir. 2004); In re Walton, 866 F.2d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 
1989); In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908, 914 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 46 The rules for dismissal under pre-BAPCPA law, 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1984), allowed for 
dismissal of a bankruptcy petition where the granting of relief would be a “substantial abuse” of the 
provisions of Chapter 7.  This was one of the most controversial changes in the BAPCPA. 
 47 Keith M. Lundin & Henry E. Hildebrand, III, Section by Section Analysis of Chapter 13 
7
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Chapter 7 petition is dismissed, his or her only remedy in bankruptcy is 
to formulate and propose a plan under Chapter 11 or Chapter 13.48  
Courts will sometimes look to how much money will be available to 
creditors in a proposed bankruptcy under Chapter 13 when determining 
whether a debtor should be allowed to remain in Chapter 7; however, this 
calculation might not accurately reflect the amount of money available to 
creditors.49  The most significant controversy that courts are called upon 
to resolve is whether a debtor’s expenses are deductible from the deb-
tor’s current monthly income.  Petitioners have attempted to deduct 
401(k) loan repayments as payments on account of “secured debts” under 
§ 707(b)(2)(A)(iii), but courts have gone to great lengths to explain how 
401(k) loans are neither “debts” nor “secured debts.”50  Courts reason 
that a debtor’s obligation under a 401(k) loan is “essentially a debt to 
himself – he has borrowed his own money.”51  Despite the valiant efforts 
that petitioners have put forth to argue that 401(k) loan repayments are 
secured debts, courts have consistently held that debtors may not deduct 
401(k) loan repayments for purposes of the means test in hopes of avoid-
ing the presumption of abuse.52 
 
After BAPCPA, SL068 ALI-ABA 65, 98 (July 21-22, 2005). 
 48 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(1) (Westlaw 2010). 
 49 See In re Walker, 2006 WL 1314125 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006) (recognizing that a debtor 
with a fully unsecured second mortgage would be entitled to deduct the full amount of the contract 
payments under § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii), however, the debtor would not actually be required to make the 
secured payments on the second mortgage while in a Chapter 13 case). 
 50 See, e.g., N.Y.C. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Villarie (In re Villarie), 648 F.2d 810, 812 (2d Cir. 
1981) (an annuitant’s withdrawal from the savings account of annuity fund is not a “debt”); Bolen v. 
Adams, 403 B.R. 396, 400-01 (N.D. Miss. 2009) (vast majority of courts have held that a debtor’s 
obligation to repay retirement account loan is not a “debt” under the Code); Eisen v. Thompson, 370 
B.R. 762, 769 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (majority view is that retirement plan loans are not secured debts); 
McVay v. Otero, 371 B.R. 190, 195 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (“there is a clear consensus that an individ-
ual’s pre-petition borrowing from his retirement account does not give rise to a secured or unsecured 
‘claim,’ or a ‘debt’ under the Bankruptcy Code”); In re Esquivel, 239 B.R. 146, 152 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mich. 1999) (“clear consensus” that borrowing from retirement account do not give rise to either 
secured or unsecured “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code); In re Fulton, 211 B.R. 247, 264 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ohio 1997) (funds borrowed from a debtor’s pension plan do not constitute a debt, and the pen-
sion plan has no right of repayment against the debtor or the debtor’s property that can be classified 
as a secured claim under the bankruptcy laws); In re Scott, 142 B.R. 126, 131-32 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 
1992) (no “debt” exists between the debtor and an ERISA pension plan); In re Jones, 138 B.R. 536, 
537-538 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991) (advance is not a debt because the city’s administrative code did 
not give the System the right to sue the debtor for the amount of the advance). 
 51 E.g., In re Egebjerg, 574 F.3d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 2009) (“the debtor’s obligation to repay 
a loan from his or her retirement account is not a ‘debt’ under the Bankruptcy Code”); In re Smith, 
388 B.R. 885, 887 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2008) (a debtor is borrowing from himself because “there is no 
separate entity to whom the debt is owed”); McVay, 371 B.R. at 195-97 (citing numerous cases fol-
lowing the same reasoning). 
 52 Id. 
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B. OTHER NECESSARY EXPENSES UNDER THE MEANS TEST 
Before the BAPCPA, former § 707(b) warranted dismissal only if 
the bankruptcy petition constituted a substantial abuse of Chapter 7.53  
Under the former Act, courts generally followed one of two tests: either 
(i) they evaluated whether an expense was reasonably necessary under a 
“totality of the circumstances” test,54 or (ii) they mechanically looked to 
the debtor’s “ability to pay” creditors in full over the three-year term of a 
Chapter 13 plan.55  Courts that used the ability-to-pay rule were quick to 
adopt a per-se rule that expenses such as 401(k) loan repayments were 
not necessary under former § 707(b).56  In those courts that adopted the 
ability-to-pay rule, the determination to dismiss a Chapter 7 petition for 
substantial abuse was based on the amount of disposable income avail-
able and the percentage of unsecured debts that would be discharged in a 
hypothetical Chapter 13 plan.57  Some courts held that a debtor left with 
any surplus income, no matter the surrounding circumstances, justified 
the dismissal of the debtor’s Chapter 7 petition.58  These courts ignored 
whether an expense was reasonably necessary. 
In contrast, the courts that adopted the totality-of-the-circumstances 
test for substantial abuse offer more guidance in determining whether the 
repayment of 401(k) loans is a necessary expense.  Courts that utilized 
the totality-of-the-circumstances test generally looked to the facts and 
circumstances of the case before allowing or disallowing a deduction 
from a debtor’s current monthly income.59  These courts did not analyze 
each specific expense to determine whether it was reasonably necessary; 
instead, a number of factors were used to determine if a petition 
amounted to a substantial abuse of Chapter 7 bankruptcy in light of the 
 
 53 See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 
312, 98 Stat. 333, 355 (1984). 
 54 See, e.g., In re Vansickel, 309 B.R. 189, 201 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2004) (finding the appropri-
ate standard in evaluating the deductibility of retirement account contributions and loan repayments 
is the totality-of-the-circumstances test). 
 55 See, e.g., In re Zaleta, 211 B.R. 178, 180-81 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1997) (finding that the abil-
ity-to-pay approach avoids debtors getting a “head start” rather than a “fresh start”); In re Edwards, 
50 B.R. 933, 937 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding that a debtor who can repay principal to his or her 
creditors is not suffering from sufficient economic hardship to warrant use of Chapter 7). 
 56 Vansickel, 309 B.R. at 204. 
 57 Id. 
 58 See, e.g., In re Behlke, 358 F.3d 429, 438 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding no bright line for dis-
missal under the ability-to-pay test); In re Walton, 866 F.2d 981, 985 (8th Cir. 1989) (“[A] finding 
that a debtor is able to pay his debts, standing alone, supports a conclusion of substantial abuse.”); In 
re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908, 913-14 (9th Cir. 1988) (the ability-to-pay approach is fully in keeping with 
Congress’s intent in enacting § 707(b)). 
 59 Vansickel, 309 B.R. at 206. 
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totality of the circumstances.60  For example, the Fourth Circuit enumer-
ated some of these considerations, including the following: 
(1) Whether the bankruptcy petition was filed because of sudden ill-
ness, calamity, disability, or unemployment; (2) Whether the debtor 
incurred cash advances and made consumer purchases far in excess of 
his ability to repay; (3) Whether the debtor’s proposed family budget 
is excessive or unreasonable; (4) Whether the debtor’s schedules and 
statement of current income and expenses reasonably and accurately 
reflect the true financial condition; and (5) Whether the petition was 
filed in good faith.61 
The Fourth Circuit further noted that the debtor’s ability to repay credi-
tors is the primary factor to be considered, and this determination must 
be made on a case-by-case basis.62 
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit applied the totality-of-the-circumstances 
test and calculated a debtor’s disposable income by starting with current 
monthly income and subtracting amounts “reasonably necessary to be 
expended . . . for the maintenance or support of the debtor.”63  The Ninth 
Circuit found that because the Code did not define the phrase “reasona-
bly necessary” or provide examples of reasonably necessary expenses, 
the court had to analyze the petition based on the debtor’s specific cir-
cumstances in order to decide whether a claimed expense was required 
for the debtor’s maintenance or support.64  According to these decisions, 
before the BAPCPA, courts had free rein to look to the facts and circum-
stances surrounding debtors’ financial situations rather than applying 
per-se rules disallowing particular deductions.  The BAPCPA, in effect, 
removed this power from the courts and statutorily dictates what is rea-
sonable or necessary.65 
By enacting the BAPCPA, Congress provided bankruptcy courts 
with more categorical guidance as to what constitutes a necessary ex-
pense.  Under the means test, “[t]he debtor’s monthly expenses shall be 
the debtor’s applicable monthly expense amounts specified under the Na-
tional Standards and Local Standards, and the debtor’s actual monthly 
 
 60 Green v. Staples (In re Green), 934 F.2d 568, 572 (4th Cir. 1991). 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Hebbring v. U.S. Trustee, 463 F.3d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 
1325(b)(2) (2000)), superseded by statute, BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005), as rec-
ognized in Egebjerg v. Anderson (In re Egebjerg), 574 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 64 Id. 
 65 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (Westlaw 2010); I.R.M. § 5.15.1.10 (2009) (setting forth 
the statutory categorical deductions allowed as Other Necessary Expenses). 
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expenses for the categories specified as Other Necessary Expenses issued 
by the Internal Revenue Service . . . .”66  The National Standards, prom-
ulgated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, include categorical deductions 
for food, housekeeping supplies, apparel and services, personal care 
products and services, and miscellaneous expenses.67  Local Standards, 
issued and published by the United States Trustee,68 generally include 
deductions for housing, transportation, and utility expenses.69  Other Ne-
cessary Expenses are outlined in the IRS’s Internal Revenue Manual, 
which lists fifteen categories of expenses that may be considered neces-
sary.70  The IRS’s list is non-exhaustive, as evidenced by Internal Reve-
nue Manual section 5.15.1.10(1)’s “necessary expense test.”71  The test 
instructs that “[o]ther expenses may be considered . . . [but] they must 
provide for the health and welfare of the taxpayer and/or his or her fam-
ily or they must be for the production of income.”72 
Bankruptcy Form 22A is the procedural form in which petitioners 
enter financial information to determine whether the Chapter 7 presump-
tion of abuse arises.73  Form 22A also lists categories of Other Necessary 
Expenses, which include taxes, health care, and involuntary deductions 
for employment.74  Under the involuntary deductions for employment 
 
 66 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (Westlaw 2010). 
 67 Eugene R. Wedoff, Means Testing in the New § 707(b), 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 231, 254 
(2005). 
 68 These amounts vary by State, County, Census Region, family size, and expense type.  The 
allowable local expenses are published through the U.S. Trustee Program website. 
 69 Eugene R. Wedoff, Means Testing in the New § 707(b), 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 231, 255 
(2005). 
 70 I.R.M. § 5.15.1.10.  These fifteen categories include accounting and legal fees, charitable 
contributions (donations to tax exempt organizations), child care (babysitting, day care, nursery and 
preschool), court-ordered alimony payments (alimony, child support, including orders made by the 
state, and other court ordered payments), dependent care (for the care of the elderly, invalid, or han-
dicapped), education, involuntary deductions, life insurance, secured or legally perfected debts, un-
secured debts, taxes, optional telephones and telephone services (pager, call waiting, caller identifi-
cation or long distance), student loans, internet provider/e-mail, and repayment of loans made for 
payment of federal taxes.  Each category of deductions has different requirements to be considered 
“necessary,” e.g., regarding expenses for unsecured debt: “If the taxpayer substantiates and justifies 
the expense, the minimum payment may be allowed.  The necessary expense test of health and wel-
fare and/or production of income must be met.  Except for payments required for the production of 
income, payments on unsecured debts will not be allowed if the tax liability, including projected 
accruals, can be paid in full within 90 days.”  Id. 
 71 I.R.M. § 5.15.1.10(1). 
 72 I.R.M. § 5.15.1.10(1). 
 73 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007 requires that the debtor file a schedule of assets and liabilities, a 
schedule of current income and expenditures, and a statement of financial affairs as prescribed by the 
appropriate Official Forms. 
 74 Official Bankruptcy Form 22A, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK_Forms_Official_2010/B_022A_0410.
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category, the Form advises petitioners to “[e]nter the total average 
monthly payroll deductions that are required for your employment, such 
as retirement contributions, union dues, and uniform costs.  Do not in-
clude discretionary amounts, such as voluntary 401(k) contribu-
tions.”75  While Form 22A provides some guidance, there is no express 
mention of 401(k) loan repayments.  Furthermore, although the language 
of the Form is helpful, the form language is not binding on the courts if it 
conflicts with statutory language.76 
Even though the National Standards, Local Standards, and the IRS’s 
Other Necessary Expenses currently provide more-concrete categories of 
necessary expenses, courts still find room to disagree as to what are con-
sidered “reasonably necessary” expenses.77  While it is no longer debated 
that 401(k) contributions cannot be deducted from income in Chapter 7 
bankruptcy petitions under the Internal Revenue Manual or Form 22A,78 
courts still disagree about whether 401(k) loan repayments are deducti-
ble. 
C. JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF 401(k) LOAN REPAYMENTS AS NECESSARY 
 EXPENSES 
Few courts have directly addressed the deductibility of 401(k) loan 
repayments as Other Necessary Expenses.  Some courts have avoided the 
issue altogether by excluding the deduction on other grounds. 79  For ex-
ample, multiple bankruptcy courts have held that 401(k) loan repayments 
 
pdf; see also 11 NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3D Rules Form 22A (2010).  Some of the other cate-
gorically necessary expenses include life insurance, court-ordered payments, education for employ-
ment or for a physically or mentally challenged child, childcare, and telecommunication services. 
 75 Id. at l. 26. 
 76 In re Barraza, 346 B.R. 724, 730 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006). 
 77 Compare In re Herbord, Nos. 07-60311, 07-60331, 2008 WL 149972 *2 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 
Jan. 14, 2008) (finding that the provisions in the Internal Revenue Manual are not applicable, and 
denying the deduction for a vehicle ownership expense), with In re Buck, No. 07-31513-KRH, 2007 
WL 4418145 *4 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Dec. 14, 2007) (finding that Form 22C in a Chapter 13 petition 
requires the court to allow a deduction for a vehicle ownership expense). 
 78 The Internal Revenue Service guidelines provide, “Contributions to voluntary retirement 
plans are not a necessary expense.”  I.R.M. § 5.15.1.10.  For a detailed analysis of the treatment of 
401(k) and other retirement account contributions in Chapter 7 and 13 petitions, see James Winston 
Kim, Saving Our Future: Why Voluntary Contributions to Retirement Accounts Are Reasonable Ex-
penses, 26 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 341 (2010). 
 79 See, e.g., Bolen v. Adams, 403 B.R. 396, 402 (N.D. Miss. 2009) (not addressing Other 
Necessary Expenses but denying a 401(k) loan-repayment deduction from Form 22A); Eisen v. 
Thompson, 370 B.R. 762, 768-72 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (not addressing the issue of 401(k) loan repay-
ments as Other Necessary Expenses and dismissing the petition on other grounds); In re Smith, 388 
B.R. 885, 888 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2008) (denying a petition because petitioners did not rebut the pre-
sumption under special circumstances while not addressing Other Necessary Expenses). 
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are not deductible under the means test because 401(k) loans do not meet 
the traditional definition of “secured debts.”80  The bankruptcy court in 
In re Thompson briefly addressed this issue and found that 401(k) loan 
repayments were deductible payments on account of “secured debts.”81  
Reasoning that payments for debts are specifically excluded from deduc-
tion under the means test, the court found that 401(k) loan repayments 
could not otherwise have been deducted as Other Necessary Expenses.82  
The district court reversed the bankruptcy court’s holding on the basis 
that 401(k) loans are not “secured debts,” leaving unresolved the de-
ductibility of 401(k) loan repayments as necessary expenses.83 
In the courts that have directly addressed 401(k) loan repayments as 
Other Necessary Expenses, the majority have generally held that such 
payments are not deductible under the means test.84  In some courts, peti-
tioners have tried to deduct 401(k) loan repayments as Other Necessary 
Expenses under the “involuntary deductions for employment” section of 
the Internal Revenue Manual and/or Bankruptcy Form 22A.85  For exam-
 
 80 In these cases, debtors attempted to deduct their monthly repayments from current monthly 
income under 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) (Westlaw 2010) as payments on secured debts.  How-
ever, courts have consistently held that 401(k) loans do not qualify as “secured debt,” and therefore 
any payments toward a loan from a 401(k) were not deductible.  See, e.g., N.Y.C. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. 
v. Villarie (In re Villarie), 648 F.2d 810, 812 (2d Cir. 1981) (an annuitant’s withdrawal from the 
savings account of the annuity fund is not a “debt”); Bolen, 403 B.R. at 400-01 (vast majority of 
courts have held that a debtor’s obligation to repay retirement account loan is not a “debt” under the 
Code); Thompson, 370 B.R. at 769 (majority view is that retirement plan loans are not secured 
debts); McVay v. Otero, 371 B.R. 190, 195 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (“there is a clear consensus that an 
individual’s pre-petition borrowing from his retirement account does not give rise to a secured or 
unsecured ‘claim,’ or a ‘debt’ under the Bankruptcy Code”); In re Esquivel, 239 B.R. 146, 152 
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999) (“clear consensus” that borrowing from retirement account do not give 
rise to either secured or unsecured “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code); In re Fulton, 211 B.R. 247, 
264 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1997) (funds borrowed from a debtor’s pension plan do not constitute a debt, 
and the pension plan has no right of repayment against the debtor or the debtor’s property that can be 
classified as a secured claim under the bankruptcy laws). 
 81 In re Thompson, 350 B.R. 770, 776 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006), rev’d sub nom. Eisen v. 
Thompson, 370 B.R. 762 (N.D. Ohio 2007). 
 82 Id. 
 83 Eisen v. Thompson, 370 B.R. 762, 767 n. 9 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (finding that because the 
debtors did not challenge the holding that loan repayments cannot be considered Other Necessary 
Expenses on appeal, the district court could not consider the issue). 
 84 See, e.g., Egebjerg v. Anderson (In re Egebjerg), 574 F.3d 1045, 1051 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(finding that 401(k) loan repayments are not the same kind and character as deductions for the health 
and welfare of the debtor allowed elsewhere in the Internal Revenue Manual); In re Lenton, 358 
B.R. 651, 655 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006) (finding that 401(k) contributions are voluntary and not de-
ductible, and therefore repayment of past voluntary contributions should receive the same treat-
ment); In re Barraza, 346 B.R. 724, 730 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006) (finding that 401(k) loan repay-
ments are not mandatory payroll deductions in Form 22A or the Internal Revenue Manual). 
 85 See, e.g., Barraza, 346 B.R. at 730 (finding that 401(k) loan repayments are not mandatory 
payroll deductions in Form 22A or the Internal Revenue Manual). 
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ple, in In re Barraza, the bankruptcy court held that retirement account 
loan repayments taken from an employee’s wages were not “mandatory 
wage deductions,” and therefore could not be deducted as Other Neces-
sary Expenses.86  Similarly, the court in In re Lenton analyzed alleged 
“involuntary deductions” under both the Internal Revenue Manual and 
Bankruptcy Form 22A.  The court found that the debtor’s monthly 
401(k) loan payment was not a condition of employment.87  Likewise, in 
In re Egebjerg, the court explained that a debtor could treat an out-
standing 401(k) loan as an early withdrawal from a 401(k) plan, thereby 
relieving any future repayment obligation; therefore, the court found that 
the loan repayments were completely voluntary.88 
The Egebjerg petitioner also attempted to deduct his 401(k) loan re-
payments on the ground that a loan-repayment plan was necessary to 
preserve a debtor’s “health and welfare.”89  The petitioner argued that re-
plenishing the amount of the loan to his 401(k), which would otherwise 
have been out of the reach of his creditors, was necessary because he was 
approaching retirement and the 401(k) plan was his only significant as-
set.90  The court quickly dismissed his claim because 401(k) loan repay-
ments “are not of the same kind and character as those expenses allowed 
elsewhere under [Internal Revenue Manual] § 5.15.1.10.”91  The court 
further explained that those expense categories of the Internal Revenue 
Manual are allowed to be treated as deductions only if there is no alterna-
tive to paying the expense.92  Additionally, the court noted that 401(k) 
contributions are not, in and of themselves, a necessary expense; there-
fore, the repayment of 401(k) loans should not be a necessary expense.93 
Finally, some petitioners have argued that the disallowance of a de-
duction for 401(k) loan repayments causes discrepancies within the Code 
that lead to contradictory outcomes for deductions.94  Accordingly, peti-
tioners have said that Congress’s intent in passing the BAPCPA was to 
include 401(k) loan repayments as necessary expenses in order to avoid 
 
 86 Barraza, 346 B.R. at 730. 
 87 Lenton, 358 B.R. at 657-58 (stating that a condition for employment would require that but 
for the expense the debtor would not be able to perform his or her job). 
 88 Egebjerg, 574 F.3d at 1051. 
 89 Id. at 1051-52. 
 90 Id. at 1051. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 E.g., In re Lenton, 358 B.R. 651, 655-59 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006) (addressing petitioner’s 
claim that not deducting 401(k) loan repayments creates a discrepancy among 11 U.S.C. §§ 707(b), 
1322(f), and 362(a)). 
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inconsistency.95  The Lenton petitioner, for instance, argued that exclud-
ing the deduction of a 401(k) loan payment materially alters the terms of 
the loan in violation of § 1322(f) of the Bankruptcy Code.96  Section 
1322(f) states “[a Chapter 13] plan may not materially alter the terms of 
a [401(k) loan] and any amounts required to repay such loan shall not 
constitute ‘disposable income’ . . . .”97  The court found that § 1322(a) 
provides for the submission of future earnings,98 and channeling debtors 
into Chapter 13 upholds the congressional intent to protect creditors 
without altering the loan.99 
In the same way, the Lenton petitioner argued that the automatic 
stay of § 362(a)100 does not stop the continued payment of every other 
necessary expense; therefore, § 362(b)(19), which precludes that auto-
matic stay from stopping the repayment of 401(k) loans, would be ren-
dered superfluous if such repayments are not treated as necessary ex-
penses.101  The petitioner claimed that 401(k) loan repayments would be 
the “only expenses in which the automatic stay does not apply and which 
[also could not] be taken as an allowable expense in the Means Test.”102  
In other words, the petitioner pointed out that creditors were barred from 
collecting money used to pay expenses for things such as legally per-
fected debts, unsecured debts, or taxes.103  But, the petitioner would be 
required to continue paying his 401(k) loan repayments during the bank-
ruptcy proceedings without any protection for those payments.  The court 
reasoned that 401(k) loan repayments are finite and will eventually be 
 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 659. 
 97 11 U.S.C.A. § 1322(f) (Westlaw 2010). 
 98 11 U.S.C.A. § 1322(a) (Westlaw 2010) (emphasis added). 
 99 Lenton, 358 B.R. at 660. 
 100 The automatic stay prevents creditors from collecting money owed by the petitioner while 
bankruptcy proceedings are in progress.  11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a) (Westlaw 2010).  For example, the 
automatic stay prevents the enforcement of a judgment obtained against the petitioner where the 
judgment was obtained before the filing of bankruptcy.  11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a)(2) (Westlaw 2010).  
Similarly, it prevents any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the petitioner that arose 
before the commencement of the bankruptcy.  11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a)(6) (Westlaw 2010).  While pro-
tecting the debtor from his or her creditors during bankruptcy proceedings, it is not a complete bar of 
any action against the debtor.  The automatic stay does not protect against the commencement or 
continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioner.  11 U.S.C.A. § 362(b)(1) (Westlaw 
2010).  Similarly, it does not protect the debtor against civil proceedings surrounding, or collections 
following, issues of paternity, child custody, marriage, or domestic violence.  11 U.S.C.A. § 
362(b)(2)(A)-(B) (Westlaw 2010). 
 101 Lenton, 358 B.R. at 659. 
 102 Id. 
 103 These are used as an example of generally accepted necessary expenses, set forth in I.R.M. 
§ 5.15.1.10, which are subject to the automatic stay requirement of 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a) (Westlaw 
2010). 
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paid off; thus, excluding the deduction of 401(k) loans from the means 
test establishes a “wait and see” approach that will channel petitioners 
into Chapter 13.104 
As indicated, courts have used numerous justifications to deny the 
deduction of 401(k) loan repayments under the means test.  Until re-
cently, no court had enunciated a per-se rule on the issue, which led to 
differing results.  In 2009, the Ninth Circuit became the first court to 
adopt a rule that 401(k) loan repayments are per se an unnecessary ex-
pense.105  Because the Ninth Circuit provided only cursory justification 
for the denial of deductions for 401(k) repayments, there is room for 
courts in other circuits to follow a different interpretation and hold that 
401(k) loans can be deducted from current monthly income under the 
means test. 
II. THE NEED FOR A CASE-BY-CASE ANALYSIS OF 401(k) LOAN 
 REPAYMENTS UNDER THE MEANS TEST 
Although several courts have disallowed the deduction of 401(k) 
loan repayments under the means test, their logic is flawed for two rea-
sons.  First, when courts have held that 401(k) loan repayments are not 
for the “health and welfare” of debtors, they have taken an extremely li-
mited view, refusing to examine exigent circumstances that could prove 
the debtors’ “health and welfare” contentions.  Second, when courts have 
held that the congressional intent behind the BAPCPA was to completely 
exclude 401(k) loan repayments, they have overlooked the fact that this 
exclusion causes discrepancies within the Code, rendering portions of the 
Code unnecessary.  Furthermore, courts that have denied the deduction 
for 401(k) loan repayments have not always been clear in their reasoning 
or have convoluted the issue in order to avoid ruling on the merits of pe-
titioners’ claims.106  Nothing in the Code or Internal Revenue Manual 
limits the definition of Other Necessary Expenses as long as the neces-
 
 104 Lenton, 358 B.R. at 660. 
 105 In re Egebjerg, 574 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 106 See, e.g., id. at 1051 (not considering that the deductions in the Internal Revenue Manual 
are non-exhaustive); Bolen v. Adams, 403 B.R. 396, 402 (N.D. Miss. 2009) (dismissing the petition 
on the grounds that 401(k) loans are not “secured debts”); Eisen v. Thompson, 370 B.R. 762, 768-72 
(N.D. Ohio 2007) (not addressing the issue of 401(k) loan repayments as Other Necessary Expenses 
and dismissing the petition on other grounds); McVay v. Otero, 371 B.R. 190, 197 (W.D. Tex. 2007) 
(basing dismissal on the “secured debt” deduction and “special circumstances” while not addressing 
Other Necessary Expenses); In re Smith, 388 B.R. 885, 888 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2008) (denying a de-
duction and finding that there can be no special circumstances besides medical conditions or a call to 
active duty in the Armed Forces that can rebut the presumption of abuse); In re Mowris, 384 B.R. 
235, 237-38 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2008) (denying a deduction where 401(k) loan repayments are not a 
condition of employment deductible as a mandatory payroll wage deduction). 
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sary expense test is met.  Additionally, there may be facts and circum-
stances, such as a petitioner nearing retirement with no other significant 
assets, that support considering 401(k) loan repayments as necessary for 
the health and welfare of a petitioner.  For those reasons, petitions should 
be looked at on a case-by-case basis to determine whether 401(k) loan 
repayments should be deducted as Other Necessary Expenses under § 
707(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
Even if a court determines 401(k) loan repayments are not deducti-
ble for the “health and welfare” of the debtor, other circumstances may 
exist that require a court to look to the facts and circumstances surround-
ing a petition.  Therefore, a rule that 401(k) loan repayments are per se 
unnecessary expenses is unfair to petitioners.  Prior to the BAPCPA, 
judges and appellate panels had the ability to look at the facts and cir-
cumstances of each Chapter 7 petition to determine whether a 401(k) 
loan repayment was a necessary expense based upon the petitioner’s fi-
nancial situation.  This individualized examination of petitions should 
not change simply because Congress chose to provide more specific 
guidance as to what qualifies as a necessary expense.  It is unfair for peti-
tioners subjected to the means test to lose the ability to show other cir-
cumstances that require the repayment of 401(k) loans.  However, courts 
continually refuse to look beyond their limited analysis to see the effect 
this reasoning has on a petitioner’s ability to afford retirement. 
This Section of this Comment argues that 401(k) loans could be 
considered Other Necessary Expenses based upon the facts and circum-
stances of a petitioner’s financial situation.  There is an inherent conflict 
between the current approach and public policy, creating practical prob-
lems of disallowing the deduction of 401(k) loan repayments.  Because 
of these concerns, this Section concludes that the totality-of-the-
circumstances test of § 707(b)(3) gives courts sufficient authority to dis-
miss abusive Chapter 7 bankruptcy petitions, and that the heavy scrutiny 
of 401(k) loan repayments under the means test is unnecessary and ulti-
mately a waste of judicial resources. 
A. COURTS SHOULD LOOK TO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 
 SURROUNDING BANKRUPTCY PETITIONS TO DETERMINE WHETHER 
 401(k) LOAN REPAYMENTS COULD BE DEDUCTED AS OTHER 
 NECESSARY EXPENSES 
For more than twenty years bankruptcy courts and appellate panels 
looked at the facts and circumstances surrounding a debtor’s financial 
situation before determining whether an expense would be considered 
necessary.  Through the BAPCPA, Congress provided a more objective 
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approach to determining which expenses should be “necessary,” through 
the National Standards, Local Standards, and Other Necessary Expenses 
determined by the IRS.107  However, Congress’s inclusion of examples of 
deductible expenses in the legislation does not preclude a court today 
from determining whether an expense is necessary for any individual pe-
titioner.  Additionally, courts are instructed to look to the facts and cir-
cumstances of a petition when testing for abuse under the totality-of-the-
circumstances test of § 707(b)(3).108  Even though these two tests are dis-
tinct, the same case-by-case approach should be undertaken in analyzing 
deductions under the means test. 
The Internal Revenue Manual’s examples of “other expenses” cate-
gorically pass the necessary expense test of section 5.15.1.10(1).109  One 
categorical necessary expense is the involuntary wage deduction, which 
is necessary as long as it is “a requirement of the job; e.g., union dues, 
uniforms, work shoes.”110  Courts have commonly found that the repay-
ment of loans on a 401(k) plan is not a requirement of the job, but rather 
is a completely voluntary wage deduction and therefore not a necessary 
expense.111  However, courts consistently neglect to acknowledge the In-
ternal Revenue Manual’s explicit necessary expense test used to evaluate 
whether other expenses could be considered necessary.  The IRS’s cate-
gorical standards and examples of other expenses are merely a small 
sample of what is a non-exhaustive list of potential necessary expenses.  
The Internal Revenue Manual advises that “[o]ther expenses may be al-
lowed if they meet the necessary expense test.  The amount allowed must 
be reasonable considering the taxpayer’s individual facts and circum-
stances.”112  Accordingly, in order to properly evaluate an expense under 
the necessary expense test, a court should look to the petitioner’s indi-
vidual facts and circumstances. 
Some bankruptcy courts have ruled that the list set forth in the In-
ternal Revenue Manual section 5.15.1.10 is exhaustive for purposes of 
the bright-line means test because Congress expressly limited deductions 
to the categories specified by the IRS.113  However, other courts have 
 
 107 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (Westlaw 2010). 
 108 In re Zaporski, 366 B.R. 758, 770-71 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2007). 
 109 In re Lenton, 358 B.R. 651, 657 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006). 
 110 I.R.M. § 5.15.1.10 (2009). 
 111 See In re Egebjerg, 574 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009); Lenton, 358 B.R. at 657; In re 
Barraza, 346 B.R. 724, 730 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006) (quoting I.R.M. § 5.15.1.10(1) and finding that 
“The Monthly Loan Payment is not a condition of Debtor’s job, but rather a condition of his 
Loans”). 
 112 I.R.M. § 5.15.1.7(6) (2009). 
 113 In re Mordis, No. 06-42590-293, 2007 WL 2962903, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Oct. 9, 
2007); In re Turner, 376 B.R. 370, 375 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2007); In re Whitaker, No. 06-33109, 2007 
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considered the applicability of the necessary expense test of section 
5.15.1.10(1) on a case-by-case basis.114  One district court in the Ninth 
Circuit went so far as to say: 
After 1984, a debtor’s expenses were either “reasonably necessary” or 
they were not. . . . If that was true after 1984, it is a fortiori true after 
2005, at least in the case of debtors with income above the median. 
For those debtors . . . the determination of disposable income is now 
meant to be a simple and straightforward matter of arithmetic based on 
sections 707(b)(2)(A) and (B). Debtors may claim applicable expenses 
[in the means test] under the IRS National and Local Standards, and 
may also claim actual Other Necessary Expenses, without any judicial 
consideration of whether those expenses are in fact “reasonably neces-
sary.”115 
Under this reasoning, any applicable expense categorized as Other Nec-
essary Expenses can be deducted when determining disposable income.  
In practice, however, what constitutes Other Necessary Expenses varies 
greatly among bankruptcy court opinions.116  Because of the confusion in 
defining necessary expenses, courts should look to the facts and circum-
stances surrounding a debtor’s financial situation before applying a per-
se rule disallowing the deduction of 401(k) loan repayments. 
In In re Barraza, for example, the bankruptcy court held that re-
tirement account loan repayments from wages are not mandatory wage 
deductions.117  Thus, they cannot be considered deductible as necessary 
expenses under either the “Other Necessary Expenses: mandatory payroll 
deductions” category of Form 22A or the involuntary wage deduction 
expense of the Internal Revenue Manual.118  The court also found that 
401(k) loan repayments are not deductible under the category of “Unse-
 
WL 2156397, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio July 25, 2007); In re Lara, 347 B.R. 198, 204 (Bankr. N.D. 
Tex. 2006). 
 114 In re Mowris, 384 B.R. 235, 238-39 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2008); Lenton, 358 B.R. at 658. 
 115 In re Chavez, No. 07-60567-13, 2007 WL 3023145, at *5 (Bankr. D. Mont. Oct. 11, 
2007).  Although the petitioner in that case filed under Chapter 13, the operative rules of Chapter 13 
allow debtors to deduct those “[a]mounts reasonably necessary to be expended . . . in accordance 
with subparagraphs (A)(ii) of paragraph (2) of section 707(b)” when determining “disposable in-
come” under section 1325(b)(2).  See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(b)(3) (Westlaw 2010). 
 116 E.g., James Winston Kim, Saving Our Future: Why Voluntary Contributions to Retirement 
Accounts Are Reasonable Expenses, 26 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 341 (2010) (discussing the deducti-
bility of retirement account contributions in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions). 
 117 In re Barraza, 346 B.R. 724, 730 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006); accord In re Turner, 376 B.R. 
370, 374 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2007) (finding that because voluntary contributions to 401(k) plans are 
completely voluntary, the fact that the debtor took a loan against voluntary contributions does not 
change the nature of the funds as they are repaid). 
 118 Barraza, 346 B.R. at 729-30. 
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cured Debts” in the Internal Revenue Manual.119  The court did not con-
sider, however, the fact that the categories of the Internal Revenue Man-
ual are non-exhaustive.  The court stated that 401(k) loan repayments are 
not for the “health and welfare” of the debtor, nor for the production of 
income; it came to this conclusion solely by evaluating the tax implica-
tions of early withdrawal, without looking to the facts and circumstances 
of the petition120 as should be required under the instruction of the Inter-
nal Revenue Manual.  As one author noted, “Nothing in the [Internal 
Revenue] Manual makes the manditoriness [sic] of the withholding be 
the sine qua non of continued employment.  If ERISA121 withholding 
constitutes an assignment of wages, then indeed it is mandatory, in the 
sense that the ERISA plan has a fiduciary duty to enforce the assignment 
mechanism.”122  The mandatory deductions from the debtor’s paycheck 
are not what determine whether the expense is necessary; the court 
should look to the facts and circumstances of the individual’s case. 
Similarly, in In re Thompson, petitioners argued that 401(k) loan re-
payments were Other Necessary Expenses.123  The bankruptcy court did 
not address the issue because it approved the deduction as a payment on 
account of secured debts under § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii).124  On appeal, the 
bankruptcy appellate panel said that the petitioners’ 401(k) loan repay-
ments were an expense for which there was no alternative because the 
401(k) loan obligation would only be terminated when one of the peti-
tioners quit his job, which would have been financially irresponsible, or 
repaid the loan in full, which would have been financially impossible.125  
The panel looked to the facts and circumstances surrounding the petition 
and found that because the 401(k) loan was taken out nineteen months 
before the bankruptcy petition, in an effort to address worsening finan-
cial difficulties, deduction for 401(k) loan repayments would have been 
allowed as a “special circumstance” under § 707(b)(2)(B).126  The panel 
 
 119 Id. at 730. 
 120 Id. at 730-31. 
 121 The Employee Retirement Income Security Act, codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 1001 et. seq. 
(Westlaw 2010).  ERISA was enacted by Congress in response to the growing number of private 
employee retirement benefit plans.  See In re Conroy, 110 B.R. 492, 494-95 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990). 
 122 David Gray Carlson, Means Testing: The Failed Bankruptcy Revolution of 2005, 15 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 223, 279-80 (2007). 
 123 In re Thompson, 350 B.R. 770, 776-77 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006), rev’d sub nom. Eisen v. 
Thompson, 370 B.R. 762 (N.D. Ohio 2007). 
 124 Id. 
 125 Eisen v. Thompson, 370 B.R. 762, 773 (N.D. Ohio 2007). 
 126 Id. at 772.  The court came to this conclusion while analyzing the petitioner’s claim of 
“special circumstances,” which would have rebutted the presumption of abuse under 11 U.S.C.A. § 
707(b)(2)(B) (Westlaw 2010).  A discussion of rebutting the presumption of abuse is beyond the 
scope of this Comment. 
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overturned the bankruptcy court’s decision on procedural grounds and 
dismissed the Chapter 7 petition.127 
Because the deduction of 401(k) loan repayments as Other Neces-
sary Expenses was not addressed by the bankruptcy court, and the issue 
was not preserved on appeal to the bankruptcy appellate panel, there is 
no guidance from the appellate panel as to whether circumstances exist 
upon which a 401(k) loan repayment could be a necessary expense.  
However, as seen in this case and its appeal, courts can come to a better 
conclusion only by looking to the facts and circumstances surrounding a 
petition.  The facts and circumstances of a petitioner’s financial situation 
can provide more information that would justify considering the expense 
necessary. 
As in Thompson, the court in In re Lenton determined that there 
may be special circumstances that under § 707(b)(2)(B)(ii) justify de-
ducting a monthly 401(k) loan payment “for which there is no reasonable 
alternative.”128  One example the court gave was a debtor originating a 
401(k) loan for the purpose of reducing unsecured debt that would oth-
erwise be paid off through a Chapter 13 bankruptcy.129  Although both 
courts described circumstances that justify deducting 401(k) loan repay-
ments when petitioners were attempting to rebut the presumption of 
abuse by showing “special circumstances” under § 707(b)(2)(B), both 
cases are also good examples of why a court should look to the facts and 
circumstances of a petition before making a determination as to the ne-
cessity of an expense. 
Allowing courts the ability to look at the facts and circumstances 
surrounding a petition avoids a potential hardship upon the debtor.  For 
example, a petitioner who has taken a 401(k) loan and used the proceeds 
to repay creditors has already repaid his debt, at least in part, and the 
debtor has not taken undue advantage of his creditors.130  At least one 
court has advised that looking to the facts and circumstances of a petition 
may be a better predictor of abuse.131  The honesty of the debtor can be 
seen by examining “whether the debtor made substantial eve of bank-
ruptcy purchases, was dishonest in filing his bankruptcy schedules and 
 
 127 Thompson, 370 B.R. at 773.  Under § 707(b)(2)(B), petitioners are required to itemize such 
expenses in order to  rebut the presumption of abuse by showing “special circumstances.”  Because 
the Thompson petitioner had not itemized these expenses in his petition, the petition was dismissed. 
 128 In re Lenton, 358 B.R. 651, 662 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006). 
 129 Id. (dismissing the Chapter 7 petition because the debtor’s 401(k) loan would end in the 
near future, thereby leaving the petitioner with disposable income that would have been sufficient to 
pay a significant amount of his or her unsecured debt). 
 130 See generally In re Vansickel, 309 B.R. 189, 210 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2004). 
 131 See In re Bender, 373 B.R. 25, 28 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2007). 
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other court documents, and whether the bankruptcy was necessitated by 
unforeseen or catastrophic events.”132 
When analyzing 401(k) contributions in a Chapter 7 petition before 
enactment of the BAPCPA, one bankruptcy court noted that “[p]ayments 
into a retirement account can be an important aspect of a debtor’s overall 
financial health and stability.”133  A number of factors can be important 
in determining the necessity of contributing to a 401(k) plan, including 
the age of the debtor, the monthly contribution amount, and the level of 
savings already accumulated in the account.134  These factors are “among 
the aspects personal to each debtor that must be considered in determin-
ing whether payments into retirement accounts should be included in 
disposable income.”135  The same line of reasoning should apply to 
401(k) loan repayments; there is little substantive difference between al-
lowing money to be contributed toward retirement savings and allowing 
money once contributed to be repaid for the same purpose.  If anything, a 
court has more evidence of abuse when looking at the reasons for which 
a petitioner borrowed from a 401(k) than it does when looking at 401(k) 
contributions. 
Hypothetically, when a debtor takes a loan from a 401(k) he or she 
likely does so for one of two reasons: for personal use, such as a vacation 
or a large purchase, or to apply the loan proceeds to pay debts such as 
overdue utility bills or credit card balances.  Under the per-se rule set 
forth in Egebjerg, these loan repayments would not qualify as necessary 
expenses regardless of the use of the loan proceeds.  It is unfair for bank-
ruptcy courts to ignore the exigent circumstances surrounding a bank-
ruptcy petition to determine whether the 401(k) loan money was used in 
a fashion that is envisioned under the bankruptcy process.  Had the indi-
vidual not taken the loan, a bankruptcy court would not have the power 
to take the money from his or her 401(k) to pay off unsecured creditors 
during the bankruptcy process.136  Because of this discrepancy, it is un-
 
 132 Id. 
 133 In re Hill, 328 B.R. 490, 495 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005). 
 134 Id.; accord In re Taylor, 243 F.3d 124, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he bankruptcy judge 
may consider any factors properly before the court, including but not limited to: the age of the debtor 
and the amount of time until expected retirement; the amount of the monthly contributions and the 
total amount of pension contributions debtor will have to buy back if the payments are discontinued; 
the likelihood that buy-back payments will jeopardize the debtor’s fresh start; the number and nature 
of the debtor’s dependants; evidence that the debtor will suffer adverse employment conditions if the 
contributions are ceased; the debtor’s yearly income; the debtor’s overall budget; who moved for an 
order to discontinue payments; and any other constraints on the debtor that make it likely that the 
pension contributions are reasonably necessary expenses for that debtor.”). 
 135 Hill , 328 B.R. at 495. 
 136 Any amount in a retirement account is not part of the bankruptcy estate and is exempt from 
the reach of the courts or creditors during a bankruptcy case.  11 U.S.C.A. § 541(b)(7) (Westlaw 
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just for a court to ignore the debtor’s motive in borrowing from a 401(k) 
plan and refuse to exempt the money paid back in loan repayments as it 
would be if it had never been touched before the debtor’s Chapter 7 peti-
tion. 
Applying a per se disallowance of expenses under the means test, a 
court has no discretion to base its ruling on whether a petitioner filed for 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy due to inability to pay necessary expenses like 
health-care costs, or whether the petitioner maxed out all his or her credit 
cards and wasted his or her savings on frivolous spending.137  By not tak-
ing these factors into consideration, the means test is bound to penalize a 
great many people who have fallen into bad circumstances through no 
fault of their own.138  One court realized this moral dilemma, albeit be-
fore the enactment of the BAPCPA, and found a proper application of 
the bankruptcy laws that respects both the definitions and rules of bank-
ruptcy construction as well as lending practices.139  That court said, 
If the trustee could establish that the pension loan at issue can be col-
laterally attacked as a fraudulent transfer, then we might have a differ-
ent case under bankruptcy law.  If, for example, the debtor used the 
loan proceeds to pay for an expensive vacation for his family to go 
skiing in the Swiss Alps, to go sunning on the Cote d’ Azur, to pay off 
a book-maker on illegal gambling debts, or to buy his spouse or sig-
nificant other a five karat diamond ring or full-length sable coat, etc., 
then the legitimacy of the loan transaction would be readily suspect.  
Or if the debtor used the proceeds of the loan for the primary purpose 
of acquiring assets otherwise exempt from execution at state law, then 
we might have to face a difficult issue.  Was this sort of ‘debtor estate 
planning’ subject to avoidance as a fraudulent transfer?140 
The court’s per-se ruling in Egebjerg suggests that people are pun-
ished if they try to make ends meet without success.  If a petitioner does 
not take a loan from his or her 401(k), the funds remain protected in sub-
sequent bankruptcy proceedings.141  If the petitioner had withdrawn the 
entirety of his or her 401(k) to try to make ends meet unsuccessfully, 
 
2010). 
 137 A Test of Means . . . or a Mean Test?, CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM, 
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2005/bankruptcy_act02.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). 
 138 Id. 
 139 In re Buchferer, 216 B.R. 332, 343 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting this moral issue but 
disallowing a deduction from current monthly income the amount of a 401(k) loan on the grounds 
that it is not a “loan” otherwise deductible on account of a secured debt). 
 140 Id. 
 141 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(b)(7) (Westlaw 2010). 
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there would be no issue as to deducting loan repayments from current 
monthly income.  Because the Egebjerg petitioner withdrew only a por-
tion of his retirement funds, the court stuck him between a rock and a 
hard place with no judicial remedy available to help alleviate his finan-
cial disaster. 
To ignore the facts and circumstances surrounding a petition leaves 
no review of other budget items such as charitable contributions or a 
lower-than-normal food or clothing allowance.  Under a per-se rule, 
courts will fail to analyze important factors that may determine the ne-
cessity of the expense, including the age and health of the debtor and his 
or her dependents, the length of time before retirement, and the amount 
of the loan repayment.  Refusing to look at the financial circumstances 
may cause inequitable results by allowing one debtor to properly deduct 
excessive car payments or legal expenses in the amount of thousands of 
dollars while denying a 401(k) loan repayment of a few hundred dollars. 
B. THE TAX CONSEQUENCES OF EARLY WITHDRAWAL, THE CURRENT 
 STATE OF THE ECONOMY, AND PUBLIC POLICY DEMAND THAT 
 COURTS REEVALUATE THE IMPORTANCE OF 401(k) LOAN 
 REPAYMENT 
A court may hold that the total amount of 401(k) loan payments is 
available to creditors by disallowing a deduction, thus believing that the 
amount will actually be repaid to those creditors.  However, if these 
payments are not allowed to continue, the petitioner suffers harsh finan-
cial penalties that will ultimately reduce the amount of money available 
to creditors.  This results from federal penalties that are assessed if the 
loan is not repaid and the outstanding balance is treated as income for tax 
purposes.142 
Hypothetically, if a debtor has a $50,000 loan from his or her 401(k) 
that he or she is not allowed to continue repaying, mandatory penalties 
and fees will be assessed that will reduce the actual amount of additional 
income available to creditors.  From that $50,000, the debtor must pay 
the fees associated with the loan,143 a federal ten-percent penalty,144 in-
come tax on the amount borrowed,145 and possible state penalties and 
 
 142 In re Vansickel, 309 B.R. 189, 200-01 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2004). 
 143 Generally, anywhere from 1% to 5% is charged as a processing fee.  KNUTE IWASZKO & 
BRIAN O’CONNELL, THE 401(k) MILLIONAIRE 40, 188 (1999).  Here, a 5% processing fee would be 
equal to an additional $2,500 taken directly out of the $50,000 loan. 
 144 26 U.S.C.A § 72(m)(5)(B) (Westlaw 2010).  Here, a 10% federal penalty amounts to a 
$5,000 penalty. 
 145 Id.  Assuming a 28% tax bracket, the petitioner would be assessed additional taxes in the 
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state income tax on that same amount.146  In a state like California, for 
example, this would leave the debtor with slightly more than half of the 
loan amount, $27,250 assuming state tax of 2.5%, to pay to his or her 
creditors from the $50,000 borrowed.  It makes little sense to punish this 
debtor so severely by taking more than half of what would have been ex-
empted from bankruptcy simply because the debtor borrowed money 
from a 401(k) plan.  The money would have been protected had the deb-
tor not taken the loan; the money should similarly be protected as it is 
paid back. 
A court should evaluate the net benefit to the creditors as it com-
pares to the lost opportunity incurred by the debtor when determining 
whether a 401(k) loan repayment is a necessary expense.147  If disallow-
ing a deduction for 401(k) loan repayment would result in substantial lost 
opportunity for the debtor and little benefit to the creditor, the court 
should use that information to determine whether an expense should be 
allowed. 
Besides the obvious direct effect of taxes and penalties on the 
amount of money actually available to creditors, there is a discrepancy 
within the Code that remains unresolved regarding the treatment of 
401(k) loan repayments.  The court in Barraza found that because 401(k) 
loan repayments are not included in the automatic stay along with re-
payments of all other debts owed to creditors, they are treated sepa-
rately.148  The Barraza petitioner argued that the disallowance of a 
401(k) deduction runs contrary to the exemption from the automatic stay 
that applies to such wage deductions.149  In other words, the petitioner 
asked “why would Congress presume under section 707(b)(2)(A) that 
this amount of money could be used to pay unsecured creditors, and then 
deny unsecured creditors access to that money in chapter 13” when the 
disallowance would force the debtor to amend the petition to Chapter 
13?150  The court admitted that it did not know the answer, yet the court 
proceeded to deny the deduction.151  This discrepancy in the Code leaves 
 
amount of $14,000. 
 146 For example, the California Franchise Board charges a 2.5% state tax on early distribu-
tions from a 401(k).  Here, a 2.5% tax would deduct an additional $1,250 from the loan amount.  To 
see how this would function on a tax return, see the Franchise Tax Board Form 3805P, available at 
http://www.ftb.ca.gov/forms/2009/09_3805p.pdf. 
 147 Vansickel, 309 B.R. at 209.  The lost opportunity referenced herein is the reduction of the 
future value of the 401(k) plan resulting from the discontinued repayments of a 401(k) loan, and the 
forgone interest that would accrue and be paid to the taxpayer on those same amounts. 
 148 In re Barraza, 346 B.R. 724, 730-31 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006). 
 149 Id. (looking at the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a) (Westlaw 2010)). 
 150 Id. at 731. 
 151 Id. 
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uncertainty for debtors and creditors alike and could be reconciled by 
protecting both 401(k) plans and 401(k) loans from the reach of creditors 
in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases. 
Although the tax considerations and practicalities of repaying credi-
tors are significant, courts should also consider the importance of con-
doning retirement saving for the protection of individuals and society 
alike.  Almost two thirds of American workers are saving little or noth-
ing for retirement.152  With the Social Security Trust Fund projected to 
run a cash flow deficit of $680,000,000,000 by the year 2035, and the 
number of beneficiaries per 100 workers jumping from about 30 to al-
most 50, it is questionable whether Social Security will be able to serve 
as the sole support for the coming generation of retirees.153 
Social Security’s current problems are serious because the system 
was never intended to be the sole source of retirement income for Ameri-
cans.154  The system functions on the theory that current contributions 
paid by today’s labor force finance the benefits taken by today’s retir-
ees.155  Social Security and pension benefits constitute about 43% of a 
person’s retirement income.156  The other 57% will have to come from 
personal savings and retirement accounts such as 401(k)s.157  The system 
worked when people only lived into their sixties, but now it cannot pos-
sibly keep up with the demand for benefits from people who will spend 
twenty or thirty years in retirement, rather than five or ten as originally 
anticipated.158  Taxpayers cannot rely on the federal government to sup-
port them during retirement, and for this reason, the judiciary should not 
deny individuals the ability to continue supporting themselves.  By disal-
lowing the repayment of 401(k) loans, courts are burdening society with 
the added cost of supporting retirement for those petitioners who could 
repay their retirement loans and rely less on the Social Security Trust 
Fund. 
Many courts have agreed on the importance of saving for retire-
ment;159 however, they have neglected to allow this to affect their deci-
 
 152 KNUTE IWASZKO & BRIAN O’CONNELL, THE 401(k) MILLIONAIRE 133 (1999). 
 153 Allan Sloan, The Next Big Bailout: Social Security, FORTUNE, July 30, 2009, 
http://money.cnn.com/2009/07/29/news/economy/fixing_social_security.fortune. 
 154 TED BENNA & BRENDA WATSON NEWMANN, 401(k)S FOR DUMMIES 18 (2003). 
 155 SUZE ORMAN, THE MONEY BOOK FOR THE YOUNG, FABULOUS & BROKE 176 (2005). 
 156 KNUTE IWASZKO & BRIAN O’CONNELL, THE 401(k) MILLIONAIRE 16 (1999). 
 157 Id. 
 158 SUZE ORMAN, THE MONEY BOOK FOR THE YOUNG, FABULOUS & BROKE 176 (2005). 
 159 E.g., In re Siler, 426 B.R. 167, 173 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2010) (“While saving for retirement 
may be prudent, it is generally unnecessary in bankruptcy . . . .”); In re Parada, 391 B.R. 492, 503 
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008) (stating that although “saving money for retirement certainly is a prudent 
investment . . . debtors should not be permitted to pay themselves money at the expense of credi-
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sion on the deductibility of 401(k) loan repayments from a debtor’s cur-
rent monthly income.  Prior to the enactment of the BAPCA, a bank-
ruptcy court realized this problem and emphasized the “critical impor-
tance for every American adult to invest prudently in his or her 
retirement income for the duration of his or her entire working life.”160  
The court went on to criticize the modern interpretation that reasonably 
necessary expenses are limited to current daily needs, arguing that that 
view “is both unrealistic and, frankly, short-sighted under the true condi-
tions of economic life in the United States.”161 
Courts should look to the practical effect of denying deductions for 
the repayment of 401(k) loans.  While it could be perceived that creditors 
will benefit in the same amount as the remaining balance of a 401(k) 
loan, this does not anticipate the fact that the balance is reduced by pen-
alties and taxes associated with early withdrawal from 401(k) plans.  Ad-
ditionally, in this current economic state, courts should realize the effect 
of their decisions on debtors whose retirement savings will be needed to 
supplement Social Security.  Therefore, allowing the deduction of 401(k) 
loan repayments in Chapter 7 bankruptcy is not only fair but also in ac-
cordance with the public policy of encouraging investment in retirement. 
C. COURTS CAN RELY ON THE TOTALITY-OF-THE-CIRCUMSTANCES 
 TEST TO DISMISS ABUSIVE BANKRUPTCY PETITIONS 
Regardless of the outcome of the presumption of abuse under the 
means test, the BAPCPA created another distinct test that provides courts 
with a second opportunity to dismiss abusive petitions.162  In In re Za-
porski, the court determined that another policy reason for allowing de-
ductions is that doing so does not mean a debtor’s case will avoid dis-
missal.163  It simply means that the debtor may avoid the presumption of 
abuse.164  The United States Trustee can still request dismissal under § 
707(b)(3) either for filing in bad faith, or because a totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis evidences abuse.165 
Prior to the BAPCPA’s establishment of the means test, courts 
 
tors”). 
 160 In re Awuku, 248 B.R. 21, 31-32 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 161 Id. 
 162 See Adam J. Ruttenberg, The Totality of What Circumstances?  How Courts Determine 
Whether Granting Bankruptcy Relief Would Be an Abuse, 2009 ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. LAW, Part 
II, § 4 (2009) (examining cases where debtors face dismissal under § 707(b)(3)). 
 163 In re Zaporski, 366 B.R. 758, 768 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2007). 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
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looked to a number of factors for determining substantial abuse under the 
former totality-of-the-circumstances test, namely: (1) whether there was 
a likelihood of future income to fund the debtor’s Chapter 11, 12, or 13 
plan; (2) whether the petition was filed as a consequence of illness, dis-
ability, unemployment, or other calamity; (3) whether the schedules sug-
gested that the debtor obtained cash advances and consumer goods with-
out the ability to repay; (4) whether the debtor’s proposed family budget 
was excessive or extravagant; (5) whether the debtor’s papers misrepre-
sented his or her financial condition; and (6) whether the debtor engaged 
in eve-of-bankruptcy purchases.166  Similarly, after the enactment of the 
BAPCPA, the court in In re Walker provided an almost identical eight-
point list of the other factors that it would consider in determining 
whether a debtor’s financial situation demonstrated abuse.167 
At present, even if not subject to the means test, or after debtors 
have successfully rebutted the presumption of abuse of § 707(b), they are 
still subject to the test for abuse set forth in § 707(b)(3)(B).168  For a deb-
tor who is subject to the means test, it is not essential for the court to de-
termine whether payments toward a 401(k) loan are necessary expenses 
because the same determination is made when analyzing the petition un-
der the totality-of-the-circumstances test for abuse.  Therefore, courts can 
save judicial resources by avoiding this tedious process in the means test 
calculations and presume that payments to a 401(k) loan are necessary 
expenses under § 707(a).  This result allows debtors subject to the means 
test the opportunity to fully present their financial status to the courts 
without affecting the courts’ ultimate ability to dismiss abusive petitions. 
Courts and commentators find it difficult to understand the relation-
ship between the means test of § 707(b)(2) and the totality-of-the-
circumstances test of § 707(b)(3).169  Courts have agreed that “the Means 
Test is only the first step in determining whether a debtor’s petition is 
abusive.  [It] functions as an initial screen to weed out those Chapter 7 
 
 166 In re Price, 353 F.3d 1135, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 167 In re Walker, 383 B.R. 830, 837-38 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2008).  This list of factors includes 
(1) whether the bankruptcy filing was precipitated by an unforeseen catastrophic event, such as a 
sudden illness or unemployment; (2) whether the debtor is eligible for Chapter 13 relief; (3) whether 
there are non-bankruptcy remedies available to the debtor; (4) whether the debtor can obtain relief 
through private negotiations; (5) whether the debtor’s proposed budget is excessive or unreasonable; 
(6) whether the debtor has a stable source of future income; (7) whether the debtor could provide a 
meaningful distribution in a Chapter 13 case; and (8) whether the debtor’s expenses could be re-
duced significantly without depriving the debtor and dependents of necessities. 
 168 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(3)(B) (Westlaw 2010). 
 169 In re Jensen, 407 B.R. 378, 383 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2009) (citing In re Johnson, 399 B.R. 
72, 75 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2008)). 
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petitions that are most clearly abusive.”170  The totality-of-the-
circumstances test provides a “backstop” that weighs unusual circum-
stances not considered under the means test.171  However, the policies 
implicit in the means test must be respected by the totality-of-the-
circumstances test.172  It is the Trustee that has the power to request dis-
missal under the totality-of-the-circumstances test.173  Therefore, it is ju-
dicially fair to give deference to the claims of the petitioner under the 
means test while relying on the “backstop” of the totality-of-the-
circumstances test to determine abuse. 
Some debtors have argued that if no presumption of abuse arises 
under the means test, then the ability to pay creditors cannot be taken in-
to account in applying the totality-of-the-circumstances test, suggesting 
that Congress created the means test to be exclusive and conclusive re-
garding ability to pay.174  Courts have regularly rejected this argument 
and reserved the right to review the surrounding facts and circumstances 
under the totality-of-the-circumstances test for abuse of a petition before 
granting relief.175  In In re Zaporski, for example, the court explained that 
§ 707(b)(3)(B) instructs a court to consider the totality of the circum-
stances of the debtor’s financial situation.176  The court stated: 
This plain language is broad enough to encompass, indeed require, 
consideration of those facts that are probative of a debtor’s ability to 
repay his or her creditors.  Such facts are in this Court’s view a cir-
cumstance of that debtor’s “financial situation” even where the deb-
tor’s petition is not filed in bad faith and even where the statutory pre-
sumption of abuse has not arisen . . . .177 
Correspondingly, regardless of the outcome under the means test, courts 
are instructed to look to the facts and circumstances of a debtor’s finan-
cial situation before dismissing a petition.  Debtors should have the same 
ability to defend claims of necessary deductions under the means test to 
avoid prejudice before dismissal. 
 
 170 Id at 384; see also In re Fowler, 349 B.R. 414, 420-21 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (explaining 
that Congress’s intent was to create an easily applied formula to determine whether a court should 
presume abuse of Chapter 7). 
 171 Jensen, 401 B.R. at 384. 
 172 Id. at 385-86. 
 173 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(3) (Westlaw 2010). 
 174 Adam J. Ruttenberg, The Totality of What Circumstances? How Courts Determine Wheth-
er Granting Bankruptcy Relief Would Be an Abuse, ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. LAW, Part II, § 4 (2009). 
 175 Id. 
 176 In re Zaporski, 366 B.R. 758, 770-71 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2007). 
 177 Id. at 771. 
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Several courts have held that voluntary contributions to a 401(k) 
plan generally should not be considered reasonably necessary expenses 
under the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.178  In In re Parada, the 
court stated that “[b]ankruptcy courts, while recognizing that saving 
money for retirement certainly is a prudent investment, have consistently 
held that debtors should not be permitted to pay themselves money at the 
expense of creditors.”179  Noting that the debtors in that case were 
“young and, hopefully, will have many years of gainful employment to 
work towards retirement,” the court found they had an ability to pay and 
ordered their case dismissed.180  This supports the conclusion that the 
means test is less conclusive than the totality-of-the-circumstances test.  
For that reason, courts should not put so much emphasis on the means 
test.  In time, a court will look to the facts and circumstances surrounding 
the petition, which will give a clearer picture of whether the petitioner is 
abusing the relief of Chapter 7 bankruptcy. 
There would be no judicial harm in considering the repayment of a 
401(k) loan a necessary expense under the means test.  Even if the pre-
sumption of abuse is successfully avoided under the means test, this fall-
back provision grants a court the power to dismiss a case regardless of 
whether 401(k) loan repayments are determined to be a necessary ex-
pense.  Evidenced by the interplay of these two tests, the BAPCPA did 
not change the totality-of-the-circumstances test that courts use in Chap-
ter 7 bankruptcy petitions.  In pre-BAPCPA cases, courts did not disal-
low deductions from current monthly income without looking to the facts 
and circumstances surrounding petitions.  Using similar factors in look-
ing at the totality of the circumstances in pre- and post-BAPCPA cases, 
courts should not apply a per-se rule disallowing such deductions. 
CONCLUSION 
Understandably, courts have a delicate job balancing between pro-
tecting creditors from people not paying their debts and protecting citi-
zens who will never truly be able to pay back their debts.  This is a diffi-
cult balance, and through the BAPCPA, Congress has decidedly tipped 
the scale in favor of creditors by holding people responsible for their fi-
nancial mistakes and broadening the circumstances that justify denial of 
petitions.  Accordingly, courts have interpreted the means test in such a 
 
 178 See, e.g., In re Behlke, 358 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 2004); In re Parada, 391 B.R. 492, 502 
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008); In re Zaporski, 366 B.R. 758 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2007); In re Cox, 249 B.R. 
29 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000). 
 179 Parada, 391 B.R. at 503. 
 180 Id. 
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way that it is nearly impossible for some debtors to obtain relief in Chap-
ter 7 bankruptcy.  By not being allowed to make deductions for 401(k) 
loan repayments, debtors will not only have their cases dismissed for 
abuse but will also suffer the financial consequences of outstanding 
401(k) loans that are considered early withdrawals. 
In fairness, courts should look to the facts and circumstances of a 
petitioner’s financial situation before determining whether an expense is 
reasonably necessary.  The categorical deductions in the Internal Reve-
nue Manual’s Other Necessary Expenses are non-exhaustive.  A per-se 
rule disallowing any deduction is prejudicial and bankruptcy courts 
should avoid letting a blanket disallowance of a deduction to preclude an 
analysis of the debtor’s financial situation. 
Additionally, a court should look to the impact of its decision before 
dismissing a Chapter 7 petition on the basis of abuse.  Not only is the 
debtor required to pay taxes and fees for an early withdrawal, but credi-
tors will not necessarily receive the money dedicated to repayment of the 
loan.  With Social Security expected to fall into a deeper deficit, courts 
should give deference to those individuals attempting to save for their 
own retirement and avoid future reliance on an already failing federal re-
tirement system. 
Finally, it does no harm to allow deduction for 401(k) loan repay-
ments under the means test because the court can use the “backstop” of 
the totality-of-the-circumstances test to dismiss abusive petitions.  Be-
cause the Trustee has the power to request dismissal under the totality-
of-the-circumstances test, it would be even more prejudicial not to give 
deference to the petitioner under the means test.  In its present state, the 
BAPCPA stacks the cards against a petitioner by providing multiple 
ways in which the court can dismiss a petition under Chapter 7. 
Only a change in judicial interpretation can resolve this issue.  The 
courts should interpret current provisions in the BAPCPA to find that 
401(k) loan repayments can be a reasonably necessary expense when 
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